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Abstract 
Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we ask how different firm 
characteristics are associated with the predicted benefits to organizational performance from 
using team production.  To compute the predicted benefits from using team production, we 
estimate structural models for financial performance, labor productivity, and product quality, 
treating the firm’s choices of whether or not to use teams and whether or not to grant teams 
autonomy as endogenous.  One of the main results is that many firm characteristics are 
associated with larger predicted benefits from teams to labor productivity and product quality but 
smaller predicted benefits to financial performance.  For example, this is true for union 
recognition as measured by the number of recognized unions in an establishment.  Similarly, 
when a particular firm characteristic is associated with lower benefits from teams to labor 
productivity or product quality, the same characteristic is frequently associated with higher 
predicted benefits to financial performance.  This is true for the degree of financial participation 
and employee ownership and also for establishment size and a number of industries.  These 
results highlight the advantages of analyzing broader measures of organizational performance 
that are more inclusive of the wide spectrum of benefits and costs associated with teams than the 
labor productivity measures frequently studied in the teams literature.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Arguments suggesting that innovative systems for organizing and managing employees 
generate improved employee achievement and organizational performance abound.  Recent 
research on workplace practices transferring power to employees, described collectively as “high 
performance practices,” has identified employee participation as a key element of sustained 
competitive advantage.  Employee participation in the form of team-based work structures, often 
“self-managed teams” conferred with considerable autonomy, figures prominently as one 
dimension of high-performance work systems and is the focus of this paper.  Specifically, our 
goal is to shed light on the question of what types of organizations benefit from team production 
and how they benefit (e.g. through higher financial performance, labor productivity, or product 
quality). 
Much of the vast literature on teams and other high-performance practices focuses on the 
question of whether and how organizations benefit from use of these practices, as opposed to the 
question of what types of organizations benefit.  A popular approach is the case study, examining 
one or a relatively small number of firms, usually over time (e.g., Bartel 2004, Batt 2004, 
Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003, Batt 2001, Batt 1999, Batt and Appelbaum 1995).  While 
the case study approach is useful for answering questions about whether and how organizations 
benefit from teams, it is somewhat less useful for answering questions about what types of 
organizations benefit, since by their very nature case studies involve little or no variation in firm 
characteristics.  Introducing variation in firm characteristics usually requires comparisons of 
different case studies, as in meta analyses.1  The difficulty with this approach is that studies vary 
widely in their data, measurement of variables, methodology, sampling period, geographic 
region of analysis, research questions, and in a variety of other respects.  If the goal is to identify 
how a particular firm characteristic, say firm size, is associated with the predicted benefits to 
organizational performance from using teams, this question is unlikely to be answered 
convincingly through comparisons across case studies.  Such a task would involve assembling a 
relatively small number of case studies that vary by the size of the organizations studied; 
inevitably these organizations will vary in a multitude of dimensions other than firm size, 
making it impossible to control for these other factors.  Even if it were possible to make 
                                                 
1
 It is, of course, possible to obtain variation in characteristics within the context of a single case study if, for 
example, one exploits variation across multiple establishments in the same firm.  Ultimately, however, general 
inferences cannot be drawn from analysis of only one or a handful of observations from a specialized production 
setting. 
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controlled comparisons, it would not be clear what weights should be assigned to the individual 
studies being surveyed.   
An alternative to the case study approach, and the one taken in this paper, is the use of 
broader cross sections or panels of organizations.  Examples of studies taking this approach 
include Black and Lynch 2004, DeVaro 2004a, 2004b, Eriksson 2003, Kato and Morishima 
2002, Neumark and Cappelli 2001, Caroli and van Reenen 2001, and Black and Lynch 2001.  
Like case studies, broader samples of firms can shed light on the question of whether and how 
organizations benefit from teams.  In addition, these data are somewhat more conducive to 
answering questions about what types of organizations benefit from teams, due to their inherent 
variation across organizational types.  Of course, these broader data sets suffer a number of 
disadvantages relative to case studies.  First, since the samples are more heterogeneous, the 
definitions of variables (for instance, the meaning of “team production”) are not as obviously 
comparable as they would be across observations in a single case study.  Second, significant 
heterogeneity in these samples increases the threat that unobserved heterogeneity may bias the 
estimated effect of teams on organizational performance.  Other things equal, panel data are 
always preferable to cross sectional data in that they can accommodate individual effects to 
mitigate concerns about unobserved heterogeneity.  However, exploiting such panel data in 
studies of team production invariably involves compromising either on the breadth of the sample 
or on the richness of the information available in the data or both.   
 Our study uses a large, nationally-representative cross section of British establishments in 
1998.  Our sample has variation not only in whether or not team production is used but on the 
type of team production used, in particular whether or not team members are granted autonomy.  
In addition to detailed firm characteristics for use as controls, the sample also includes multiple 
measures of organizational performance (financial performance, labor productivity, and product 
quality).  To our knowledge, there are no large, nationally-representative panel data sets 
available that contain information on the types of teams used (autonomous or non-autonomous), 
firm characteristics, and multiple measures of organizational performance.  Our research strategy 
is therefore to exploit the unique and extensive information contained in our cross sectional data, 
while estimating structural models to address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity biases. 
 There are three main distinguishing features of our work.  First, we estimate structural 
models that treat the choices of team production and whether to grant teams autonomy as 
endogenous variables, as opposed to the typical approach that treats these variables as exogenous 
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right-hand-side variables in a regression.  Second, our models interact the “teams” treatment with 
all other firm characteristics (both observed and unobserved).  Allowing the teams treatment 
effect to vary with organizational characteristics allows us to make statements about what types 
of organizations are predicted to benefit from team production. 
Third, we compare three measures of organizational performance (financial performance, 
labor productivity, and product quality) in the same analysis, allowing us to make statements 
about how teams benefit organizational performance.  Though there are some exceptions such as 
DeVaro 2004a and Huselid 1995, financial performance is rarely seen as the outcome measure in 
studies of the effects of high-performance practices on organizational performance.  This 
variable is of particular interest as an overall measure of firm performance, since as a measure of 
profit it is more inclusive than other outcome measures of the wide array of benefits and costs 
associated with human resource practices.2   
 There are three stages to our empirical analysis.  In the first stage, we estimate structural 
models for our three measures of organizational performance.  In the second stage, we use the 
parameter estimates from the first stage to compute the “predicted benefit to organizational 
performance from using team production” for each establishment in our sample.  In the third 
stage we assess how a particular firm characteristic is associated with the predicted benefits to 
organizational performance from using team production, holding other firm characteristics 
constant. 
A progressive example is useful for motivating our structural approach.  Consider the 
following two regressions, where Y is a continuous measure of firm performance, TEAMS is a 
dummy variable equaling one if the firm uses team production and zero otherwise, X is a firm 
characteristic such as firm size, and ε is a disturbance term uncorrelated with TEAMS and firm 
size:  
 
                                                 
2
 A more commonly used outcome variable in this literature is labor productivity (DeVaro 2004b, Eriksson 2003, 
Kato and Morishima 2002, Black and Lynch 2001, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997, Banker, Field, 
Schroeder, and Sinha 1996, Ichniowski 1990).  Other outcome variables have also been studied, such as innovation 
and R&D (Michie and Sheehan 1999), turnover (Huselid 1995), worker well-being and wages (Caroli and van 
Reenen 2000, and Bauer and Bender 2001), product quality (DeVaro 2004b, Ichniowski and Shaw 1999, 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997, Banker, Field, Schroeder, and Sinha 1996), worker satisfaction (Batt 2004, 
Batt and Appelbaum 1995, Godard 2001), worker absenteeism (Askenazy et al. 2001) and firms’ layoff rates 
(Osterman 2000).  An extensive survey of the empirical literature outside the discipline of economics concerning the 
effects of team production can be found in Cohen and Bailey 1997.   
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Y = β0 + β1TEAMS + β2X + ε                                      (1) 
Y = β0 + β1TEAMS + β2X + β3(TEAMS × X) + ε       (2) 
 
(In practice, of course, X would be a vector containing many characteristics other than firm size.)  
If the goal is to ask what the effect of teams is on firm performance, either regression would be 
informative.  The teams “treatment effect” of interest would be β1 in Model 1 and β1 + β3X in 
Model 2.  If, on the other hand, the goal is to ask (as in this paper) whether the benefits from 
teams are greater in larger firms than in smaller firms or vice versa, only Model 2 is informative.  
If the estimated β3 is found to be negative, we would conclude that the benefits to organizational 
performance from using teams decrease with firm size.  In sum, Model 2 provides a simple way 
of answering our research question of what types of firms (or in this example what size firms) 
benefit from team production.   
 Model 2 assumes that the unobserved determinants of firm performance are the same 
whether team production is used or not.  Allowing these unobserved determinants of firm 
performance to differ by whether or not teams are used, or interacting TEAMS with ε, yields the 
following generalization of Model 2: 
 
Y = β0 + β1X + ε1      if TEAMS = 1           (3) 
    = β2 + β3X + ε0      if TEAMS = 0 
 
The teams treatment effect in Model 3 is (β0 – β2) + (β1 – β3)X.  This is computationally identical 
to the teams treatment effect in Model 2.  Models 1, 2, and 3 can be criticized on the grounds that 
they assume that the disturbances are uncorrelated with TEAMS, a case that is quite difficult to 
make.  Even if X were to include a detailed set of observable firm characteristics, there would 
inevitably be some inherently unobservable factors (such as managerial talent or the degree of 
congeniality and cooperation among the workers) that would influence both firm performance 
and the tendency of the firm to engage in team production.  The consequence is that in all three 
regressions the estimated teams treatment effect is biased, yielding misleading answers to the 
question of whether firms benefit from team production and to the question of whether large 
firms experience different benefits from teams than do small firms. 
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 To address this endogeneity problem, one can specify an additional equation that 
determines TEAMS.  Letting TEAMS* denote a continuous latent index that can be thought of as 
the firm’s propensity to engage in team production, consider the following Model 4: 
 
Y = β0 + β1X + ε1      if TEAMS = 1           (4) 
    = β2 + β3X + ε0      if TEAMS = 0 
TEAMS* = α0 + α1Z + ε2       
TEAMS = 1 if TEAMS* > 0 
              = 0 if TEAMS* ≤ 0 
 
Assuming multivariate normality of the disturbances, estimation of this model yields consistent 
estimates of the teams treatment effect of interest.  Whereas in Model 3 we incorrectly imposed 
(implicitly) the assumptions cov(ε1, ε2) = 0 and cov(ε0, ε2) = 0, in Model 4 these covariances are 
unrestricted parameters to be estimated. 
 The structural models we estimate in this paper are only slightly more complicated than 
Model 4, the two main differences being that our measures of Y are discrete rather than 
continuous and that we introduce autonomy into the model and treat it as endogenous in addition 
to teams.  These models were proposed and estimated in a pair of recent related papers (DeVaro 
2004a, 2004b).  The first of these considered financial performance (interpreted as profit) as the 
measure of organizational performance, and the second considered labor productivity and 
product quality.  Both papers addressed the question of whether team production affects 
organizational performance but did not consider how these effects differ in different types of 
firms.  In the present paper, we consider all three measures of organizational performance and 
ask how the predicted benefits of teams vary with organizational characteristics.  We now turn to 
a discussion of the theoretical background underlying teams research and previous evidence on 
what types of organizations are most likely to benefit from team structures.  
 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE BENEFITS OF 
TEAMS TO ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Theoretical models in the economics literature on the effects of team production on 
organizational performance involve a comparison of the benefits and costs to team production 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  Some of the main benefits of team production accrue through 
 6 
productive information sharing among workers, when potential team members have knowledge 
that is non-duplicative and also relevant to the production process (Lazear 1995, 1998).  The 
potential costs of team production include costs associated with regular team meetings and 
training, and shirking and free-riding among team members (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
Holmstrom 1982, Rasmusen 1987, Itoh 1991, 1992, McAfee and McMillan 1991, Legros and 
Matthews 1993).  Kandel and Lazear 1992 argue that teams alleviate costly monitoring of 
workers in the presence of asymmetric information by relying on monitoring of workers through 
peer pressure. 
In empirical work, team structures are sometimes the central focus of the analysis (e.g. 
DeVaro 2004a, 2004b, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw 
2003) and are sometimes one of a number of high performance practices that are analyzed 
together (e.g. Eriksson 2003, Black and Lynch 2001, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997).  
Frequently the teams under study are self-managed or autonomous, reflecting the fact that such 
teams are used more commonly than closely-managed or non-autonomous teams.3  A common 
finding in the literature is that autonomous teams have positive effects on firm performance.  For 
example, Eriksson 2003 finds a positive effect of self-managed teams on labor productivity in a 
cross section of establishments, and Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003 finds a fourteen 
percent increase in labor productivity after the introduction of self-managed teams in a garment 
manufacturing plant.   
 
What Types of Organizations Benefit From Team Production? 
 While much has been written on the subject of whether and how teams confer benefits to 
organizational performance, less attention has been devoted to the question of what types of 
organizations benefit from teams.  Our analysis addresses a large number of organizational 
characteristics, but the following four are of particular interest:  union membership, firm size, 
financial participation and employee ownership, and industry.  We now discuss what the 
previous literature has to say about the relationship between teams and each of these in turn. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 However, recent evidence from a large, nationally representative sample of British establishments suggests that 
both types of teams confer benefits of similar magnitude to financial performance, labor productivity, and product 
quality (DeVaro 2004a, 2004b).   
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Union Membership 
While some argue that the presence of unions at the workplace constrains the ability of 
management to redesign jobs to incorporate new work systems such as teams, others claim that 
unions can promote the introduction and continued existence of such systems by facilitating 
increased dialogue between workers and management.  A meta-analysis conducted by 
Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003 concluded that unions have a negative impact overall on labor 
productivity in the United Kingdom.4   Empirical evidence in the previous literature on the 
relation between the presence of unions and teams has been mixed.  Osterman 1994 found that 
the presence of unions in an organization is not an important determinant of the adoption of high 
performance workplace practices, including self-managed teams, whereas McNabb and 
Whitfield 1997 found that recognized unions facilitate the introduction of teamwork in 
establishments.   
Apart from this issue of adoption of teams, the question of whether the benefits to firm 
performance from using teams vary with the presence of unions has been addressed by Black and 
Lynch 2004.  That study found that when union membership and self-managed teams are 
interacted in a cross-section regression, the effect on labor productivity is negative, suggesting 
that unionized establishments that use self-managed teams tend to have lower labor productivity.  
When union membership and self-managed teams are interacted in a fixed effects regression, the 
effect on labor productivity is positive.  However, neither of these results was statistically 
significant.  McNabb and Whitfield 1997 used cross-sectional data from the third wave of the 
Worker Industrial Relations Survey (the wave previous to the one used in the current paper) to 
show that the joint effect of union presence and teamwork on relative financial performance is 
positive.  Our findings are closer to Black and Lynch’s cross sectional results in that ours suggest 
negative relationships between financial performance and both the presence of unions in the 
establishment and the number of recognized unions in the establishment.  
 
Firm Size 
 To our knowledge, there has been no work done on the relationship between firm size 
and the predicted benefits from team production, though some attention has been devoted to the 
question of how the adoption of team production varies with firm size.  For example, Osterman 
                                                 
4
 This result does not necessarily generalize across countries.  For example, Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003 show 
in their meta-analysis that there is a positive association between unions and labor productivity in the United States. 
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1994 used data on 694 manufacturing establishments in the U.S. to find that smaller 
establishments are more likely to adopt innovative work practices including teams.  McNabb and 
Whitfield 1997, on the other hand, found that the propensity to adopt teamwork programs is 
positively associated with firm size and being part of a large organization.  The question of 
whether the benefits from team production vary by firm size is of interest if for no other reason 
than the fact that most labor market measures vary with firm size.  One story that could give rise 
to a firm-size effect concerns the relative costs of alternative means of monitoring workers.  It 
might be that in smaller organizations, internal monitoring by peers in the context of teams is 
more effective than in larger organizations.  An alternative story that would suggest the opposite 
result is that larger organizations face greater problems of coordination and information sharing 
than do smaller organizations, so that the benefits from teams would be increasing in the scale of 
the organization. 
 
Financial Participation and Employee Ownership 
In our study, worker participation in firm decision making is considered at the group 
level and is reflected in the granting of autonomy to team members (giving team members the 
latitude to jointly decide how the work is to be done).  Since over half of the teams in our sample 
are autonomous by this definition, the decision to organize production in teams very often 
coincides with a decision to increase the degree of worker participation in firm decision making 
at the group level.  Recent research has shown that such employee involvement in decision 
making is an effective means of enhancing firm performance when implemented along with 
employee ownership schemes such as profit sharing and share ownership (Kruse, Freeman, 
Blasi, et al. 2004, Kruse 2002, Freeman and Dube 2000, Kruse and Blasi 1997, Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi 1997, Ben-Ner and Jones 1995).  Eriksson 2003 argued that new work 
practices and new pay practices such as teams bonus, individual bonus, stock or stock options, 
and profit sharing are complementary in the sense that, if a firm that has adopted new work 
practices introduces performance related pay schemes, this enhances productivity further, though 
this complementarity is found to be more on the level of individual compensation schemes, 
rather than group based pay incentives.  Ben-Ner and Jones 1995 argued that both ownership 
without participation, and participation without ownership, can actually decrease firm 
performance by increasing worker-firm conflict.  Adams 2003 found the existence of 
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complementarities between the use of profit sharing and the delegation of decision-making 
power on an individual basis to production line workers.   
Other studies have argued that financial participation is conducive to aligning the goals of 
the employees with the goals of the firm by directly linking the workers’ pay to firm 
performance.  However, the goal-alignment process needs to be supported both by financial 
participation and employee ownership, or what is called “direct participation,” and employee 
involvement in decision-making at all levels of the firm hierarchy, or what is called “indirect 
participation” (Kato and Morishima 2002).  Kruse 2002 has explained the intuition as follows: 
“Employee ownership may improve firm performance by decreasing labor-management conflict 
and serving as a collective incentive to improve workplace cooperation, information-sharing, and 
organizational citizenship behavior.  This may be limited by the free-rider problem when rewards 
are shared with co-workers, direct incentives for better work becomes weak as the number of 
coworkers expands.  To counteract this problem and encourage higher performance, firms may 
combine employee ownership with employee participation in decision-making and other human 
resource policies to encourage a sense of ownership, draw more fully on worker skills and 
information, and create company spirit and work norms.” (Kruse 2002, p. 71)  In this paper we 
present evidence corroborating this complementarity hypothesis; our analysis shows that 
establishments whose employees engage in higher levels of financial participation are also more 
likely to benefit from team production through higher financial performance.   
 
Industry 
 According to the cross-sectional analysis of McNabb and Whitfield 1997, the presence of 
teamwork programs is most common in the wholesale and retail sectors, and least likely in 
production industries and non-metal manufacture, whereas establishments in banking, insurance 
and finance are generally more likely to adopt teams.  Empirical statements about which 
industries experience the largest predicted benefits from teams and other workplace practices 
must be made primarily on the basis of comparisons of different case studies or different 
industry-specific data sets.  The vast majority of past studies have focused on the manufacturing 
industry.  Comparatively less is known about the effects of teams on firm performance in other 
industries, though there are some results.  In services, an example is Batt 1999, which found that 
the use of self-managed teams among customer service and sales workers yields a statistically 
significant improvement in self-reported service quality and sales per employee (the measure of 
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labor productivity in sales occupations).  When combined with new technology usage, teams 
boost sales by an even greater magnitude.  Batt and Appelbaum 1995 looked at two industries, 
namely telecommunications (where they considered customer service staff as well as “network 
crafts” occupations such as installation and repair crews) and apparel manufacturing (where they 
considered sewing machine operators) and found that teams have a significant and positive 
impact on workers’ perceptions of the quality of work done by their work groups.5  Batt’s (2001) 
empirical results suggest that there are no significant differences in labor productivity and 
service quality when field technicians work in teams rather than independently. 
In manufacturing, the effect of teams and other high-performance work practices has 
generally been found to be positive.  Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003 found a fourteen 
percent increase in labor productivity after a switch to self-managed teams in a garment 
manufacturing plant in Northern California.  Also in the apparel manufacturing industry, Berg, 
Appelbaum, Bailey and Kalleberg 1996 found that team production improved such outcomes as 
quality, costs, and responsiveness to retailers via better coordination among team members as a 
result of their ability to self-regulate work, eliminate bottlenecks, resolve conflicts, help one 
another solve problems, and make improvements to the production process.   
Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw 2003 used data from the steel manufacturing sector to find 
that production lines that adopt problem-solving teams experience large gains in productivity.  
However, this is true only for production lines that undertake complex production processes and 
products – in less complex environments, there is no benefit to using teams. Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi 1997 studied the effects of high performance workplace systems in a specific 
production process in steel manufacturing, namely steel finishing lines.  They considered teams 
(specifically the existence and prevalence of formal work teams for the purposes of problem-
solving activities, and worker membership in multiple problem-solving teams) as one of a 
number of HRM (human resource management) practices used, though their focus was on HRM 
systems more generally rather than teams specifically.  Their results indicate that finishing lines 
which utilize a set of innovative work practices have higher levels of worker productivity than 
lines that use more traditional practices and that there exist complementarities between certain 
high performance practices.   
                                                 
5
 Batt and Appelbaum 2003 also looked at employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment as dependent 
variables.  They found that for workers in the network crafts and sewing machine operators occupations, teams 
significantly improve job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  On the other hand, for workers in customer 
service occupations, this is not the case. 
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Black and Lynch 2001 found that U.S. firms in manufacturing that use high performance 
workplace practices such as regular group meetings, benchmarking, self-managed teams and 
profit sharing have higher productivity and wages than other firms.  Black and Lynch 2004 
suggested that the adoption of such innovations was an important factor contributing to the jump 
in multifactor productivity of the U.S. economy in the second half of the 1990s.  On the other 
hand, Cappelli and Neumark 2001 studied the effects of high-performance work practices 
including benchmarking, regularly scheduled group meetings to discuss work-related problems, 
job rotation, self-managed teams, pay for skill and profit sharing in a panel of manufacturing 
firms.  Their results show that these practices may raise productivity, though with little statistical 
significance and that the effects on overall labor efficiency are small. 
 
III. DATA: WORKPLACE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS SURVEY (WERS) 1998 
The data are from the management questionnaire in the 1998 wave of the British 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), jointly sponsored by the Department of Trade 
and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Policy Studies 
Institute.  Distributed via the UK Data Archive, the WERS data are a nationally representative 
stratified random sample covering British workplaces with at least ten employees except for 
those in the following 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) divisions: agriculture, 
hunting, and forestry; fishing; mining and quarrying; private households with employed persons; 
and extra-territorial organizations.  Some of the 3192 workplaces targeted were found to be out 
of scope, and the final sample size of 2191 implies a net response rate of 80.4% (Cully et al. 
1999) after excluding out-of-scope cases.  Data were collected between October 1997 and June 
1998 via face-to-face interviews, and the respondent was usually the most senior manager at the 
workplace with responsibility for employment relations.  Table 1 displays the industry 
composition of the sample, using twelve industry categories in the 1992 SIC.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Our measures of organizational performance are discrete responses to three survey 
questions concerning the establishment’s current financial performance, labor productivity, and 
quality of product or service, relative to other establishments in the same industry.  Responses 
include:  “A lot better than average”, “Better than average”, “About average for industry”, 
“Below average”, “A lot below average”, and “No comparison possible.”  Few establishments 
report below-average performance for any of the three measures.  While this might indicate 
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reporting error in the dependent variables, such errors need not have consequences for our 
analysis unless a respondent’s likelihood of overstating performance is systematically related to 
the choices of teams and autonomy.6  Furthermore, an establishment’s inclusion in the sample is 
conditional on its being operational, and length-biased sampling arises when operational 
establishments are sampled at a point in time.  High-performing establishments have long 
durations of operation and are more likely to be sampled than low-performing establishments 
with low durations of operation.  The pronounced asymmetry in reported performance that is 
observed in the data is therefore not surprising.7   
The 1998 wave of the WERS includes a follow-up question asking respondents their 
interpretation of the term “financial performance.”  The frequency of responses is as follows:8 
Interpretation of “Financial Performance” Number of Firms % of Firms 
Profit or Value Added 952 52.9 
Sales, Fees, Budget 374 20.7 
Costs or Expenditure 389 21.6 
Stock Market Indicators (e.g., Share Price) 54 3.0 
Other Specific Answer 31 1.7 
Total 1800 100.0 
 
Studies using earlier waves of these data did not have access to this follow-up question and were 
forced to pool disparate interpretations of the dependent variable in the same analysis (Machin 
and Stewart 1990, 1996, McNabb and Whitfield 1997).  As shown in DeVaro 2004a, the 
estimated effect of teams on financial performance is very sensitive to the interpretation of 
financial performance.  When estimating the model for financial performance, we use only those 
establishments interpreting financial performance as profit or value added. 
 A skeptic might argue that the three subjective measures of organizational performance 
are measuring essentially the same thing.  If that were the case, we would expect extremely high 
correlations among the three measures.  This is not so, as revealed by the following correlation 
matrix: 
                                                 
6
 This kind of misreporting could arise if managers who adopt innovative work practices want to believe that their 
organizations are doing better, thereby rationalizing their decision to employ those practices. 
7
 Consistent with this line of argument, Machin and Stewart have shown the subjective financial performance 
measure in the WIRS to be a good predictor of workplace closure.   
8
 The responses sum to 1800 instead of the full 2191 because some respondents reported that no comparison was 
possible or that the relevant data were not available. 
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Correlation Matrix for the Measures of Organizational Performance 
 Financial Performance Labor Productivity Product Quality 
Financial Performance 1.000   
Labor Productivity 0.507 1.000  
Product Quality 0.328 0.352 1.000 
 
The correlations are all positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, but their 
average value is only 0.40. 
 For each establishment, the data contain information about the proportion of employees 
in the largest occupational group that works in formally designated teams.  Responses are in the 
following discrete categories:  “All 100%”, “Almost all 80-99%”, “Most 60-79%”, “Around half 
40-59%”, “Some 20-39%”, “Just a few 1-19%”, “None 0%”.  An advantage of this survey 
question is that it specifically refers to “formally designated” teams.  This precise wording of the 
question directs the respondent’s attention to situations of true joint production and should 
reduce the respondent’s likelihood of reporting the use of teamwork simply on the basis of a 
cooperative or friendly atmosphere of “team spirit” at the workplace.  A drawback of the survey 
question is that it is restricted to the largest occupational group at the establishment.  The sample 
may contain establishments in which team production is heavily used in occupational groups 
other than the largest, yet the response to this question might be “None 0%”.  This measurement 
issue is one limitation of the study.   
The survey also contains a measure of team autonomy that corresponds well to the 
notions of autonomy discussed in the theoretical literatures of economics and organizational 
behavior (Aghion and Tirole 1997, Hackman 1987).9  For establishments that report the use of 
formally designated teams in the largest occupational group, the respondent manager is asked to 
respond “Yes” or “No” to the following statement:  “Team members jointly decide how the work 
is to be done.”  Since both the team and autonomy variables are defined in terms of the 
establishment’s largest occupational group, we provide the distribution of the sample by largest 
occupational group in the lower panel of Table 1.  All observations in the WERS are coded 




                                                 
9
 See DeVaro 2004a for a discussion of the theoretical rationale for granting teams autonomy. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
There are three stages to our methodology.  First, we estimate structural models for each 
of our three measures of organizational performance (financial performance, labor productivity, 
and product quality).  Second, we use the estimated parameters from the first stage to compute 
for each establishment in the sample a “predicted benefit to organizational performance from 
using team production”.  These first two stages closely follow DeVaro 2004a and DeVaro 2004b, 
so our treatment here is brief, and we relegate the technical details to the appendix.  Third, we 
ask how the “predicted benefit” computed in our second stage varies as a function of the firm 
characteristics in the model.  This sheds light on what types of firms are likely to benefit from 
team production and in what areas (financial performance, labor productivity, product quality) 
they are likely to benefit.   
 
Stage 1:  Estimating Structural Models of Teams, Autonomy, and Organizational Performance 
The model has the same structure for each measure of organizational performance.  Since 
the three endogenous variables (organizational performance, teams, autonomy) in each model are 
observed as discrete responses, the structural model specifies probabilities for all possible 
outcomes.  To make the analysis tractable, some aggregation is needed to reduce the number of 
outcomes.  Since relatively few respondents report below-average performance, we aggregate the 
lowest three categories for each of the organizational performance measures as follows: (1 = 
“About average for industry” or below; 2 = “Better than average”; 3 = “A lot better than 
average”).  Furthermore, we consider only whether team production is used or not in the largest 
occupational group, rather than focusing on the fraction of that group that engages in team 
production.  That is, we aggregate the teams variable as follows:   
TEAMS  = 1 if positive fraction of workers in the largest occupational group is in teams 
    = 0 otherwise 
 The sequence of the model is as follows.  First, the establishment decides whether or not 
to use teams (TEAMS = 0 or 1).  Given that teams are chosen, the establishment then decides 
whether to grant the teams autonomy (AUTO = 0 or 1).  Finally, these choices of teams and 
autonomy affect organizational performance.  Let Yi* denote a latent indicator of organizational 
performance for the ith establishment, relative to the industry average, and let Yi denote its 
ordered, discrete realization, taking values of 1, 2, or 3.  The four-equation structural model has 
the following form: 
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Yi* = αAUTOi + X1iδ1 + ε1i     if TEAMSi = 1 
      = X1iδ2 + ε0i     if TEAMSi = 0   
TEAMSi* = X2iβ + ε2i 
AUTOi* = X3iγ + ε3i    if TEAMSi = 1 
Yi = 1 if Yi* < 0 
     = 2 if 0 ≤ Yi* < c        where c > 0 
     = 3 if Yi* ≥ c  
 
TEAMSi = 1 if TEAMSi* > 0 
   = 0 otherwise 
AUTOi = 1 if AUTOi* > 0 and TEAMSi* > 0 
 = 0 if AUTOi* ≤ 0 and TEAMSi* > 0 
 
We assume multivariate normality of the disturbances, (ε0, ε1, ε2, ε3) ~ N(0, Σ), and estimate the 
four equations jointly by maximum likelihood.  The vector of parameters to be estimated, θ, 
includes α, δ1, δ2, c, β, γ, σ02, σ12, σ13, and σ23, where the notation σij means cov(εi, εj).   
 By treating organizational performance as a switching regression, we allow for a full set 
of interactions between teams and all observed and unobserved determinants of performance.  
Autonomy, on the other hand, enters only as a dummy-endogenous variable on the right-hand-
side of the organizational performance equation when teams are used.  In principle, it would be 
possible to allow for a full set of interactions of autonomy with the determinants of performance, 
but that analysis would not be feasible with our sample size.10 
                                                 
10
 The statistical model requires some standard identifying restrictions on the disturbance covariance matrix.  All of 
its diagonal elements are normalized to one.  Furthermore, both the disturbance covariances σ01 and σ03 are assumed 
to be zero.  The restrictions on the covariance matrix are weaker than those that are imposed in the simpler “non-
structural” approaches common to the teams literature.  These approaches also impose (implicitly) σ01 = 0 and σ03 = 
0.  In addition, however, they impose the restrictions σ02 = 0, σ12 = 0, σ13 = 0, and σ23 = 0, whereas our models treat 
these as unrestricted parameters to be estimated.  This issue is not discussed in the teams literature, because with the 
standard approach of using a single equation for organizational performance (with only one disturbance term in the 
model), treating teams and/or autonomy as exogenous variables on the right-hand side, all of these assumptions are 
implicit rather than explicit as they are in our models.  Apart from the nonlinearities introduced by the distributional 
assumptions, identification of the model is facilitated by a set of exclusion restrictions on the covariates in each 
equation.  The specification for each equation is detailed in the appendix.  More discussion of the exclusion 
restrictions and their justification on the basis of theory, previous empirical work, and independent tests confirming 
that the variables appear unimportant in the equations from which they are excluded, can be found in DeVaro 
(2004a, 2004b).   
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Stage 2:  Constructing Predicted Benefits of Teams to Organizational Performance   
The estimation results from Stage 1 allow us to construct measures of the “predicted 
benefits from using teams” for each establishment in the sample.  Recall that the measures of 
organizational performance assume values of 1, 2, or 3 according to whether the establishment’s 
recent performance relative to that of others in the industry is average or below, better than 
average, or a lot better than average.  The effect of teams on organizational performance is the 
change in the probabilities that performance is in each of these three categories when team 
production is used in the largest occupational group compared to when it is not used.  Letting Yi 
denote the discrete measure of organizational performance (taking values 1 = “average or 
below”, 2 = “above average”, 3 = “a lot above average”), the following three measures give the 
effect of team production on performance for establishment i:11 
(Effect A1)i = Prob(Yi = 1 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A2)i = Prob(Yi = 2 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 2 | TEAMSi = 0) 
(Effect A3)i = Prob(Yi = 3 | TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 3 | TEAMSi = 0) 
Since for an individual establishment these three effects must sum to zero, any two of them 
contain all of the information about the effect of team production on that establishment’s 
performance.  We therefore focus on Effects A1 and A3.   
 
Stage 3:  How Do the Predicted Benefits from Teams Vary With Firm Characteristics? 
 We next ask how the predicted benefit from using team production that we compute in 
Stage 2 varies as a function of the covariates in the model.  That is, we are interested in seeing 
how the functions Effect A3 and Effect A1 vary with changes in a particular firm characteristic, 
holding the other firm characteristics constant.  We do this computation slightly differently 
according to whether the covariate in question is a single dummy variable, one dummy variable 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11
 In the appendix, we state the formulae for computing these three effects.  The notation for these Effects “A1”, 
“A2”, and “A3” was introduced in DeVaro 2004a and 2004b.  In those studies, the role of the “A” in the notation 
was to distinguish the effects from the analogous “predicted benefits from using autonomous teams” (Effects B1, 
B2, and B3) and the “predicted benefits from using non-autonomous teams” (Effects C1, C2, and C3).  We do not 
discuss the “B” and “C” effects in the present paper, because here we are interested in the relationships of the firm 
characteristics to the predicted benefits from teams.  In principle, we could analyze either the “B” effects or the “C” 
effects like we do the “A” effects, though this would yield no insights beyond those we present in the paper.  The 
reason is that while the structural model interacts the “teams treatment” with all of the covariates, the “autonomy 
treatment” simply shifts the intercept.  Hence, any relationships between the covariates and the “B” or “C” effects 
arises because of interactions of the covariates with “teams” rather than with “autonomy.”  
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from a group of related dummies, or a “continuous” variable.12  When the covariate of interest is 
a dummy variable, X, we compute (Effect A3 | X = 1) – (Effect A3 | X = 0) for each workplace, 
evaluating each of the other covariates at their actual establishment values.  Then we take the 
average of these differences across all workplaces in the sample to obtain a summary measure of 
how Effect A3 varies with changes in X.  We follow the analogous approach for Effect A1.  If 
the particular X is one dummy in a group of related dummies the computation is the same as the 
one just described, except that the other dummies in the same group are evaluated at zero rather 
than at their observed values for each workplace.  The three groups of dummies that are 
considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables.  The reference 
group for each of these categories is the wholesale and retail industry, clerical and secretarial 
occupations, and public sector workplaces.  Finally, when the covariate of interest is 
“continuous”, the differences we compute are not between X = 1 and X = 0 but rather between 
the 0.75 and 0.25 quantile of X, again evaluating all of the other covariates at their individual 
values for each workplace.   
More precisely, consider the following definitions: 
x ji        ≡ covariate j for establishment i 




   ≡ vector of covariates for establishment i excluding covariate x ji  when x ji  is one 
dummy variable in a multiple-dummy group, setting to zero all other dummies in the 
multiple-dummy group to which x ji  belongs 
x
q
j        ≡ quantile q of covariate x j    
Then the following expressions illustrate how Effects A3 and A1 change, on average, with a 
particular covariate x j : 
Case 1: x j  is binary but not part of a multiple-dummy group   












ijkjiijkji xxxx EffectAEffectANEffectA 1 ,,
,03,1313    
                                                 
12
 The only covariates in the model that are “continuous”, in the usual sense, are establishment size and the fraction 
of employees who work part time.  However, the model also includes several variables recorded in the survey as 
ordered discrete categories.  These include information, incentive alignment, and decisions (5 categories each); work 
at home (6 categories); multi-skilling and off-site training (7 categories each); and number of recognized unions (11 
categories).  To economize on the number of parameters to be estimated, we treat each of these variables as 
continuous indexes rather than creating multiple dummies for each category.  In unreported sensitivity checks we 
found the same qualitative results in models that include these variables as multiple dummies rather than as 
“continuous” indexes.   
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Case 2: x j  is binary and part of a multiple-dummy group (i.e. industry, occupation, ownership)  
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Case 3: x j  is continuous 


































 The preceding definitions refer to the quantiles 0.25 and 0.75.  Note, however, that the 
estimation samples differ for the three measures of organizational performance (N = 889 for 
financial performance, N = 1660 for labor productivity, N = 1839 for product quality) and 
therefore the quantiles may differ as well.  Since most of the covariates are binary, however, the 
quantiles of interest are frequently identical across the three estimation samples.  The only 
exceptions are establishment size, number of part time workers, financial participation, multi-
skilling, and number of recognized unions, and for these variables the quantiles differ only 
slightly across the three samples.  For consistency, we define all quantiles using the largest 
sample of the three, namely the product quality sample.  We also tried estimating all three 
models on the smallest sample of 889 observations, so that the quantiles exactly coincided for 
each model, and the results were similar to those we report here.  Our preference, however, is to 
report results based on the largest estimation sample possible for each of the three measures of 
organizational performance.     
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations of the variables in the model.  We present 
the parameter estimates from the structural models (Stage 1 of our three-stage methodology 
outlined in the previous section) in the appendix Tables A, B, and C.  Since the structural models 
are nonlinear, these parameter estimates lack straightforward interpretations.  For our purposes, 
they are useful mainly for computing Effects A3 and A1 in Stage 2 for each of the three 
measures of organizational performance.  The difference between Effect A3 and Effect A1 
provides a univariate index of the predicted benefits of team production on organizational 
performance and facilitates a simple presentation of the distributions of these benefits.13  Figures 
1, 2, and 3 display kernel density estimates of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) for financial performance, 
labor productivity, and product quality.  These distributions have a slight negative skew for 
financial performance and labor productivity and a slight positive skew for product quality.  As 
the graphs illustrate, all three distributions peak at a positive number, indicating that the typical 
establishment is predicted to benefit from team production through higher labor productivity, 
product quality, and financial performance.14  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
Our main results are from Stage 3 of our analysis, and these are displayed in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5 for financial performance, labor productivity, and product quality.  The first and second 
columns of each table illustrate how Effects A3 and A1 vary with a particular firm characteristic, 
                                                 
13
 While a univariate measure of the predicted benefits from teams eases the presentation of results, collapsing 
Effects A3 and A1 into (Effect A3 – Effect A1) necessarily involves some loss of information, since neither Effect 
A3 nor Effect A1 can be inferred from their difference.  For example, suppose that one workplace has Effect A3 = 
0.10 and Effect A1 = -0.07, whereas another has Effect A3 = 0.07 and Effect A1 = -0.10.  Both are ranked the same 
by the criterion Effect A3 – Effect A1.  However, this lost information is not particularly useful for our purposes.  
To see why, consider an alternative to (Effect A3 – Effect A1) that assigns greater weight to increases in Effect A3 
than to decreases in Effect A1, or vice versa.  Using such an alternative criterion, one of the two workplaces in the 
example could clearly be ranked above the other in terms of predicted benefits from teams.  Absent any information 
about the establishments’ loss functions, however, there is no clear basis for weighting increases in Effect A3 
differently from decreases in Effect A1.   
14
 More detailed information on the overall effects of teams (as opposed to the interactions we focus on in this 
paper) can be found in DeVaro 2004a and DeVaro 2004b.  Those analyses report magnitudes at the 0.25, 0.50, and 
0.75 quantiles of (Effect A3 – Effect A1) as well as the analogous information for autonomous teams and non-
autonomous teams (as opposed to teams in general).  Those studies also report all of these results from models that 
treat teams and autonomy as exogenous, to determine the nature of the bias that arises when the endogeneity of 
teams and autonomy is ignored.   
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holding the other characteristics constant.  The third column displays the difference between the 
first two columns, thus answering the question of how Effect A3 – Effect A1 varies with a 
particular covariate, holding the others constant.  Table 6 summarizes the qualitative results from 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 by listing firm characteristics along with the sign of their predicted effect on 
organizational performance (i.e., the sign of ∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1)).  Before commenting on 
the results, we note that a limitation of our analysis is that many of the parameters underlying the 
predicted benefits of teams are estimated with low precision.  As a result, the confidence bands 
associated with the differences we report in Tables 3, 4, and 5 would be fairly wide.  Our results 
should therefore be viewed as suggestive, and definitive statements will require corroboration in 
future work with new data sets.         
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.] 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE.] 
The results concerning unions, firm size, industry, and financial participation and 
employee ownership are of particular interest.  As seen in Table 6, workplaces at which some 
employees belong to a union are predicted to lose in all three dimensions from using teams. 
Having some unionized workers is associated with a decrease of more than 7 percentage points 
in the probability that labor productivity is a lot above the industry average and more than a 5 
percentage point decrease in the probability that product quality is a lot above the industry 
average.  These changes are accompanied by increases in the probability that performance is at 
or below the industry average of more than 15 percentage points for labor productivity and 
nearly 7 percentage points for product quality.  The predicted benefit of teams to financial 
performance is also lower in the presence of unionized workers.  While the probability that 
financial performance is a lot above the industry average is actually slightly higher in unionized 
settings, the probability that financial performance is average or below also increases (and by a 
greater amount).   
While a greater degree of union recognition (measured by the total number of recognized 
unions at the workplace) is associated with benefits to labor productivity and product quality 
from using teams, the reverse is true for financial performance.  This result highlights the type of 
misleading inference that might be drawn by focusing solely on outcome measures such as labor 
productivity and product quality (both of which are common in the empirical teams literature) 
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rather than on broader measures such as financial performance that are more inclusive of various 
benefits and costs.  While labor productivity and product quality might indeed be helped by 
teams in settings with high union recognition, it might be that the costs of organizing team 
members are prohibitively large and overshadow the benefits.   
These results concerning unions, along with the finding from Black and Lynch 2004 that 
the interaction of union membership and self-managed teams was insignificant in regressions of 
labor productivity, cast doubt on the hypothesis that team production is more likely to enhance 
firm performance in unionized settings.  On the other hand, McNabb and Whitfield 1997 found 
that the joint effect of union presence and teamwork on relative financial performance is positive 
in their analysis of the 1990 WIRS, the predecessor of WERS.  While the McNabb and Whitfield 
result is counter to ours, there are some important differences between the two studies that might 
account for the discrepancy.  First, the studies differ methodologically in that McNabb and 
Whitfield estimate a binomial logit for financial performance whereas we estimate a structural 
ordered probit in which teams and autonomy are endogenous.  Second, since the questions on 
teams that we use are new to the 1998 WERS, McNabb and Whitfield used a different measure 
of teams.  Third, we estimate our financial performance model only on those establishments for 
which the respondent interprets the term financial performance as synonymous with profit or 
value added.  This restriction was not possible in the McNabb and Whitfield analysis, since the 
1990 WIRS did not ask about the respondent’s interpretation of financial performance.  This 
difference is potentially important.  For example, DeVaro 2004a found that the estimated effect 
of teams on financial performance is quite sensitive to the respondent’s interpretation of financial 
performance.       
Regarding firm size, we see that larger establishments experience larger predicted 
benefits from teams to financial performance.  However, smaller establishments experience 
larger predicted benefits from teams to both labor productivity and product quality.  One 
interpretation of these results is that the nature of the monitoring problem changes with the scale 
of the organization, such that internal monitoring by peers in the team context is relatively more 
effective when the organization is small (so that labor productivity is enhanced more by teams in 
small establishments).  But in larger establishments there is greater scope for specialization of 
tasks and also more diversity in worker information sets, implying that team members’ 
information sets are more likely to be non-duplicative (so that the benefits of teams are higher).  
Such benefits from teams in large establishments might outweigh the potentially higher costs of 
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monitoring, so that on net the benefits of teams to financial performance are increasing with 
establishment size.  The result concerning establishment size further highlights the dangers of 
drawing inferences about the benefits of teams based on measures of organizational outcomes 
that do not capture the full spectrum of benefits and costs from teams.  
Our results for financial participation suggest that establishments in which workers 
receive compensation through various types of variable-pay schemes, including profit-related 
pay and share ownership schemes, experience higher predicted benefits from teams to financial 
performance than do establishments with less participation.  This result is consistent with the 
complementarity hypothesis discussed earlier.  While financial participation is associated with 
higher predicted benefits of teams to financial performance, it is also associated with lower 
predicted benefits of teams to labor productivity and product quality.  As was the case for 
establishment size, this result suggests that standard outcome measures such as labor 
productivity are not inclusive enough of the various benefits and costs of teams to identify the 
positive organizational benefits from teams that accrue in firms with a high degree of financial 
participation.    
All of the industry results should be interpreted relative to the reference group of 
wholesale and retail.  Relative to wholesale and retail, the financial services and other business 
service industries have lower predicted benefits of teams to all three measures of organizational 
performance, and the education industry has higher predicted benefits across all three measures.  
Predicted benefits to financial performance and labor productivity in manufacturing are higher 
than in wholesale in retail, which is consistent with a significant volume of previous work in the 
manufacturing sector (focusing heavily on measures of labor productivity as an organizational 
outcome) that is generally supportive of positive effects of team production on firm performance.  
An interesting result is that for all of the other industries, the sign of the predicted benefits of 
teams is common for labor productivity and product quality but is the opposite of that for 
financial performance.  For example, industries for which the predicted benefits of teams to labor 
productivity and product quality are negative but the predicted benefits to financial performance 
are positive include health, public administration, construction, and electricity, gas, and water.  
Industries for which the predicted benefits to labor productivity and product quality are positive 
but the predicted benefits to financial performance are negative include hotels and restaurants, 
transport and communication, and other community services. 
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 In addition to the results on unions, firm size, financial participation, and industry, some 
further interesting results emerge concerning the other covariates.  We conclude this section by 
noting a few of these.  First, the result concerning the age of the establishment is interesting.  The 
binary variable “operation over five years” is associated with lower predicted benefits of teams 
to all three measures of organizational performance, suggesting that younger firms experience 
larger benefits from teams.  Second, the results concerning the variables “incentive alignment” 
(i.e., employees are fully committed to the values of the firm) and “decisions” (i.e., most 
decisions at this workplace are made without consulting employees) are as we would expect.  
That is, a greater degree of disagreement with the statement about incentive alignment and a 
greater degree of agreement with the statement about decisions is associated with lower 
predicted benefits of teams to all three measures of organizational performance.  Third, the 
results concerning “work at home” are intuitive as well:  as the fraction of time spent working at 
home during normal business hours increases, the predicted benefits of teams to all measures of 
organizational performance decrease (by over 2, 1, and 2 percentage points for financial 
performance, labor productivity, and product quality, respectively), which is to be expected since 
frequent interaction and collaboration with other team members is necessarily reduced when an 
employee does a significant amount of work from home.   
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While a significant volume of research addresses the question of how teams and other 
high-performance work practices affect organizational performance, comparatively little 
attention has been devoted to the question of what types of organizations benefit from teams.  
Our paper has aimed to partially address this gap.  Although we report results for a large set of 
firm characteristics, our focus has been on firm size, unions, financial participation, and industry.  
A distinguishing feature of our approach is the use of structural models in which teams and 
autonomy are treated as endogenous determinants of organizational performance.  This is 
important because accurate measures of the extent to which the benefits of teams to 
organizational performance vary with organizational characteristics require accurate measures of 
the predicted benefits of teams to organizational performance.  If the firm’s choices of teams and 
autonomy are treated as exogenous, as is common in the teams literature, then the resulting 
estimates of the effects of teams and autonomy will be biased as a result of correlations among 
 24 
the unobserved determinants of teams, autonomy, and organizational performance.  As shown in 
DeVaro 2004b such biases can be quite substantial, particularly in the case of product quality. 
An interesting general pattern of results that emerges from our analysis is that while a 
particular firm characteristic might be associated with large predicted benefits of teams to labor 
productivity and product quality, the same firm characteristic is often associated with lower 
predicted benefits of teams to financial performance.  Similarly, even when a characteristic is 
associated with lower benefits of teams to labor productivity or product quality, it often is 
associated with higher benefits to financial performance.  This finding is of particular interest 
since financial performance is much less frequently seen as an outcome variable in this literature 
than measures like labor productivity or product quality.  Since financial performance, as a 
measure of profit, is more inclusive than these other measures of the full spectrum of benefits 
and costs induced by teams, our results suggest that studies that focus only on labor productivity 
and product quality might produce an incomplete picture of the total effect of teams on firm 
performance.  
In future research, it would be interesting to implement our structural approach using 
other datasets.  One possibility is to make use of the fifth wave of the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey when it is released.  We close our discussion with a final recommendation.  
While our structural models interact the “teams” treatment with all of the firm characteristics, 
autonomy enters our models only as an intercept shift.  In future work with larger data sets, it 
would be interesting to generalize the model by interacting autonomy with all of the firm 
characteristics as well.  This would allow two separate regressions to be run in Stage 3, one for 
the “predicted benefits to organizational performance from using autonomous teams” and 
another for the “predicted benefits to organizational performance from using non-autonomous 
teams.”  Then one could discern what types of firms would benefit more from autonomous team 
production than from closely-managed team production, and vice versa. 
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APPENDIX 
The statistical model specifies probabilities for each of the nine possible outcomes that a 
workplace might realize.  Letting i index workplaces, these potential outcomes and their 
probabilities are as follows: 
Probability Yi = TEAMSi = AUTOi = 
P1i(θ) 1 1 1 
P2i(θ) 1 1 0 
P3i(θ) 2 1 1 
P4i(θ) 2 1 0 
P5i(θ) 3 1 1 
P6i(θ) 3 1 0 
P7i(θ) 1 0 unobserved 
P8i(θ) 2 0 unobserved 
P9i(θ) 3 0 unobserved 
 
Let Zji = 1 if workplace i experiences the jth outcome 
           = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, 2, … , N and j = 1, 2, …, 9 
 





















Since each of the endogenous variables is observed only discretely, each probability of the form 
Pji(θ) is a multiple integral of the joint density f(ε0i, ε1i, ε2i, ε3i).  Suppressing all subscripts i, the 
expression for P1(θ) is as follows:   
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 Probabilities P2(θ) to P9(θ) are similarly defined. 
 
Formulae for Computing Effects A1, A2, A3 
Each effect is a function of the Pj(θ) and is computed as follows, evaluating the 












































































We include the following common set of control variables in each of X1, X2, and X3.  
Single-Establishment Firm: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is either a single 
independent establishment not belonging to another body, or the sole UK establishment 
of a foreign organization and equals 0 if the establishment is one of a number of different 
establishments within a larger organization       
 
Establishment Size: total number of full time, part time, and temporary workers at the 
establishment   
 
Fraction of Part Time Workers: number of part time workers at the establishment as a fraction 
of establishment size 
  
Temporary Workers: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are temporary agency employees 
working at the establishment at the time of the survey and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are employees who 
are working on a temporary basis or have fixed-term contracts for less than one year and 
equals 0 otherwise 
 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year: dummy variable that equals 1 if there are employees who 
have fixed term contracts for one year or more and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Union workers: dummy variables that equals 1 if any of the workers at the establishment belong 
to a union and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a private sector 
company and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Private Sector Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is a private 
sector company but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise 
 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is an 
alternative private sector firm and a franchise and equals 0 otherwise  
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Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise: dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is an 
alternative private sector firm but not a franchise and equals 0 otherwise  
 
The following additional control variables were included in the financial performance 
equation in DeVaro 2004a, and we include them in our labor productivity and product quality 
models as well so that our specification is identical across the three measures of organizational 
performance.  A number of these additional variables have been found to be significantly 
associated with financial performance in earlier analyses of the WIRS/WERS data, for example, 
union activity, (Bryson and Wilkinson 2002); training (Collier et al. 2003); and financial 
participation (McNabb and Whitfield 1998).     
 
Financial Participation:  dummy variable that equals 1 if any employees at the workplace  
        receive payments or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes (profit-  
        related payments or bonuses, deferred profit sharing schemes, employee share ownership 
        schemes, individual or group performance-related schemes, other cash bonus).  This 
        variable was included in the financial performance equation in McNabb and Whitfield 
        1998 and found to be significant; their study used data from an earlier wave of the survey, 
        so their definition of this variable differed slightly from ours. 
 
Owner Manager:  dummy variable that equals one if any of the controlling owners of the 
        workplace are actively involved in day-to-day management on a full-time basis, and zero  
        otherwise.  This question was only asked of private sector workplaces for which a single 
        individual or family has controlling interest (meaning at least 50% ownership) over the 
        company. 
 
Foreign Owned:  dummy variable that equals one if workplace reports that either of the 
following two statements best describes the ownership of the workplace (predominantly 
foreign owned, meaning 51% or more; foreign owned/controlled) and zero if any of the 
following three statements is chosen (UK owned/controlled, predominantly UK owned, 
meaning 51% or more; UK and foreign owned).  This question was asked only of private 
sector workplaces. 
 
Operation Over Five Years:  dummy variable that equals one if the workplace has been operating 
at its present address for 5 years or more, and zero otherwise 
 
Multi-Skilling:  Degree of multi-skilling at the workplace in the largest occupational group.  
Question asks what fraction of these employees are formally trained to be able to do jobs 
other than their own.  Responses are: “None 0%” (1); “Just a few 1-19%” (2); “Some 20-
39%” (3); “Around half 40-59%” (4); “Most 60-79%” (5); “Almost all 80-99%” (6); “All 
100%” (7). 
 
Number of Recognized Unions:  Total number of recognized unions at the workplace 
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Induction Training:  dummy variable that equals one if there is a standard induction programme 
designed to introduce new employees (in the largest occupational group) to the workplace, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Off-site Training:  discrete variable measuring the proportion of experienced employees (in the 
largest occupational group) that have had formal off-the-job training (away from the 
normal place of work, but either on or off the premises) over the last 12 months.  
Responses are: “None 0%” (1); “Just a few 1-19%” (2); “Some 20-39%” (3); “Around half 
40-59%” (4); “Most 60-79%” (5); “Almost all 80-99%” (6); “All 100%” (7). 
 
 In the TEAMS equation we include a dummy variable indicating whether a just-in-time 
system is in operation at the establishment.  Specifically, the employer is asked “Does this 
workplace operate a system designed to minimize inventories, supplies or work-in progress?  
This is sometimes known as Just-in-Time.”  Responses are coded as one for yes and zero for no.   
 In the autonomy equation we include a set of four proxies for the organizational and 
informational structure of the establishment, the alignment of incentives between workers and 
owners, and the importance to the firm of monitoring inputs.  The first three of these are 
qualitative measures of managerial opinion.  The respondent manager is asked to comment on 
each of a list of statements, responding with “Strongly agree” (1), “Agree” (2), “Neither agree 
nor disagree” (3), “Disagree” (4), or “Strongly disagree” (5).  The questions of interest as 
determinants of team autonomy are as follows: 
 
Information:  “Those at the top are best placed to make decisions about this workplace.” 
Incentive Alignment:  “Employees here are fully committed to the values of this 
organization.” 
Decisions:  “Most decisions at this workplace are made without consulting employees.” 
 
In addition to these managerial opinion variables, as a proxy for the importance the employer 
places on monitoring worker inputs, we include a discrete variable measuring the proportion of 
workers at the establishment that ever work from home during normal working hours.  
Responses include: “Half or more 50%+”, “A quarter up to a half 25-49%”, “Up to a quarter 10-
24%”, “A small proportion 5-9%”, “Hardly any (less than 5%)”, or “None 0%”.   
The full specification of the exogenous variables in X1, X2, and X3 is summarized in the 
following table.   
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Exogenous Variables Included in Structural Models 
 FINPERi LABPRODi QUALITYi TEAMSi AUTOi 
 X1 X1 X1 X2 X3 
Single-Establishment Firm YES YES YES YES YES 
Establishment Size YES YES YES YES YES 
Fraction of Part Time Workers YES YES YES YES YES 
Temporary Workers YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Union Workers YES YES YES YES YES 
Private Sector Franchise YES YES YES YES YES 
Private Sector Non-franchise YES YES YES YES YES 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise YES YES YES YES YES 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise YES YES YES YES YES 
Financial Participation YES YES YES   
Owner Manager YES YES YES   
Foreign Owned YES YES YES   
Operation Over Five Years YES YES YES   
Multi-Skilling YES YES YES   
Number of Recognized Unions YES YES YES   
Induction Training YES YES YES   
Off-site Training YES YES YES   
Just-In-Time Production 
 
  YES  
Information 
    
YES 
Incentive Alignment 
    
YES 
Decisions 
    
YES 
Work at Home 
    
YES 
Industry Controls (12) 
   
YES YES 
Occupation Controls (10) 





Estimates from the Structural Model for Financial Performance 
 FINPER* (TEAMS=1) FINPER* (TEAMS=0) TEAMS* AUTO* 
1.103** AUTO (0.205) ● ● ● 
0.122 -0.337 -0.349**    -0.261** Single-Establishment Firm (0.107) (0.253) (0.160) (0.119) 
0.006 0.047 0.028 -0.009 Establishment Size (0.010) (0.059) (0.028) (0.010) 
0.231 -0.136 0.479 -0.248 Fraction of Part Time Workers (0.152) (0.405) (0.329) (0.229) 
0.165* 0.244 0.251* -0.291** Temporary Workers (0.095) (0.181) (0.129) (0.132) 
0.016 -0.123 0.164 -0.017 Fixed Term Workers Under One Year (0.073) (0.261) (0.135) (0.104) 
-0.052 -0.172 0.126 0.232 Fixed Term Workers Over One Year (0.119) (0.371) (0.256) (0.167) 
0.103 0.203 0.078 0.057 Union Workers (0.122) (0.267) (0.137) (0.117) 
Financial Participation 0.207** (0.084) 
0.068 
(0.235) ● ● 
Owner Manager 0.126 (0.108) 
-0.176 
(0.296) ● ● 
Foreign Owned -0.166** (0.099) 
-0.286 
(0.346) ● ● 
Operation Over Five Years -0.013 (0.103) 
0.238 
(0.285) ● ● 
Multi-Skilling 0.023 (0.019) 
-0.027 
(0.047) ● ● 
Number of Recognized Unions -0.090** (0.033) 
0.027 
(0.112) ● ● 
Induction Training -0.088 (0.109) 
-0.334 
(0.232) ● ● 
Off-site Training 0.013 (0.015) 
0.004 
(0.034) ● ● 
0.384 -2.743** 0.644 -0.247 Private Sector Franchise (0.364) (0.007) (1.663) (0.508) 
0.070 0.293 0.180 0.235 Private Sector Non-franchise (0.145) (0.369) (0.254) (0.243) 
0.100 0.742 0.147 -0.222 Alternative Private Sector Franchise (0.380) (1.648) (1.091) (0.573) 
-0.263* 0.660* 0.260 0.514** Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise (0.148) (0.357) (0.260) (0.261) 
0.350** Just-in-time ● ● (0.135) ● 
0.092** Information ● ● ● (0.042)  
-0.261** Incentive alignment ● ● ● (0.071) 
0.023 Decisions ● ● ● (0.048) 
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-0.065 Work at Home ● ● ● (0.060) 





 02 (17.149) 
0.618 
σ 12 (5.656) 
-0.804** 
σ 13 (0.001) 
-0.533** 
σ 23 (0.038) 
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses and are based on 75 bootstrap replications.  * and ** indicate  






Estimates from the Structural Model for Labor Productivity 
 LABPROD* (TEAMS=1) LABPROD* (TEAMS=0) TEAMS* AUTO* 
0.768** AUTO (0.267) ● ● ● 
0.054 -0.026 -0.140 -0.190* Single-Establishment Firm (0.091) (0.298) (0.122) (0.107) 
-0.003 -0.039 0.052** -0.004 Establishment Size (0.005) (0.073) (0.024) (0.004) 
0.277** 0.237 -0.301* 0.040 Fraction of Part Time Workers (0.127) (0.328) (0.219) (0.181) 
-0.043 -0.190 0.110 -0.277** Temporary Workers (0.073) (0.288) (0.219) (0.075) 
0.010 -0.059 0.220** -0.043 Fixed Term Workers Under One Year (0.081) (0.217) (0.103) (0.080) 
0.066 -0.420 0.251 0.004 Fixed Term Workers Over One Year (0.082) (0.384) (0.163) (0.093) 
-0.020 0.388* 0.146 -0.051 Union Workers (0.079) (0.233) (0.103) (0.087) 
Financial Participation 0.098 (0.065) 
0.378* 
(0.223) ● ● 
Owner Manager 0.089 (0.117) 
0.039 
(0.322) ● ● 
Foreign Owned 0.079 (0.102) 
0.165 
(0.300) ● ● 
Operation Over Five Years 0.050 (0.098) 
0.118 
(0.298) ● ● 
Multi-Skilling 0.044** (0.015) 
0.062* 
(0.040) ● ● 
Number of Recognized Unions -0.009 (0.022) 
-0.069 
(0.123) ● ● 
Induction Training 0.047 (0.070) 
-0.099 
(0.248) ● ● 
Off-site Training 0.022 (0.016) 
0.097* 
(0.054) ● ● 
0.557** -2.751** 0.670 -0.596** Private Sector Franchise (0.278) (0.454) (1.379) (0.287) 
0.144 0.217 -0.069 -0.094 Private Sector Non-franchise (0.099) (0.347) (0.175) (0.137) 
-0.557 -0.282 -0.152 -0.274 Alternative Private Sector Franchise (0.373) (1.980) (0.414) (0.373) 
-0.052 0.457 -0.170 0.103 Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise (0.106) (0.431) (0.183) (0.131) 
0.289** Just-in-time ● ● (0.118) ● 
0.105** Information ● ● ● (0.032)  
-0.190** Incentive alignment ● ● ● (0.041) 
0.059 Decisions ● ● ● (0.037) 
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-0.060 Work at Home ● ● ● (0.046) 





 02 (0.361) 
0.386 
σ 12 (1.415) 
-0.496** 
σ 13 (0.018) 
-0.693** 
σ 23 (0.009) 
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses (75 bootstrap replications).  * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and   
5% levels, respectively.   Dummies for industry and largest occupational group are also included in the TEAMS* and AUTO* equations.  The 





Estimates from the Structural Model for Quality of Product or Service 
 QUALITY* (TEAMS=1) QUALITY* (TEAMS=0) TEAMS* AUTO* 
1.234** AUTO (0.123) ● ● ● 
0.181* 0.144 -0.183 -0.155 Single-Establishment Firm (0.090) (0.173) (0.123) (0.105) 
0.002 -0.080* 0.048** -0.004 Establishment Size (0.003) (0.047) (0.020) (0.005) 
0.043 0.246 -0.204 0.001 Fraction of Part Time Workers (0.103) (0.243) (0.189) (0.161) 
0.075 -0.224 0.067 -0.208** Temporary Workers (0.073) (0.162) (0.095) (0.081) 
-0.092 -0.030 0.205** -0.021 Fixed Term Workers Under One Year (0.057) (0.171) (0.091) (0.064) 
-0.014 -0.224 0.242* 0.059 Fixed Term Workers Over One Year (0.071) (0.229) (0.141) (0.099) 
-0.059 0.003 0.189* -0.007 Union Workers (0.077) (0.168) (0.099) (0.094) 
Financial Participation -0.039 (0.054) 
0.016 
(0.147) ● ● 
Owner Manager 0.206** (0.103) 
0.179 
(0.186) ● ● 
Foreign Owned 0.079 (0.072) 
-0.283 
(0.265) ● ● 
Operation Over Five Years 0.037 (0.078) 
0.388* 
(0.213) ● ● 
Multi-Skilling 0.020 (0.018) 
0.049 
(0.031) ● ● 
Number of Recognized Unions -0.047** (0.016) 
-0.064 
(0.070) ● ● 
Induction Training 0.067 (0.066) 
0.116 
(0.160) ● ● 
Off-site Training 0.018 (0.013) 
0.003 
(0.034) ● ● 
0.517* 0.261 0.840 -0.578 Private Sector Franchise (0.276) (1.206) (1.384) (0.356) 
0.373** 0.492* -0.031 -0.093 Private Sector Non-franchise (0.077) (0.259) (0.152) (0.114) 
0.068 0.007 -0.070 -0.402 Alternative Private Sector Franchise (0.279) (0.858) (0.347) (0.345) 
0.282** 0.547* -0.126 0.004 Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise (0.094) (0.281) (0.162) (0.111) 
0.303** Just-in-time ● ● (0.086) ● 
0.071** Information ● ● ● (0.027)  
-0.202** Incentive alignment ● ● ● (0.038) 
0.057* Decisions ● ● ● (0.032) 
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-0.071** Work at Home ● ● ● (0.035) 





 02 (0.003) 
0.071 
σ 12 (0.391) 
-0.741** 
σ 13 (0.002) 
-0.489** 
σ 23 (0.045) 
Note: Standard errors from the parametric bootstrap are in parentheses and are based on 75 bootstrap replications.  * and ** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  Controls for industry and establishment’s largest occupational group are also included in the 
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TABLE 1: 
Distribution of Workplaces by Industry and Largest Occupational Group 
 Number of 
Establishments 
Percent 
 of Total 
Distribution by Industry 
Manufacturing 299 13.7 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 80 3.7 
Construction 112 5.1 
Wholesale and Retail 322 14.7 
Hotels and Restaurants 127 5.8 
Transport and Communication 136 6.2 
Financial Services 101 4.6 
Other Business Services 227 10.4 
Public Administration 183 8.4 
Education 244 11.1 
Health 249 11.4 
Other Community Services 111 5.1 
         Total 2191 100 
Distribution by Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators 15 0.7 
Professional Occupations 309 14.1 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations 180 8.2 
Clerical & Secretarial Occupations 390 17.8 
Craft & Related Occupations 231 10.5 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations 314 14.3 
Sales Occupations 237 10.8 
Plant and Machine Operatives 278 12.7 
Other Occupations 237 10.8 
         Total 2191 100 
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TABLE 2: 
Means and Standard Deviations 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables 
Financial Performance 1.801 0.728 
Labor Productivity 1.632 0.681 
Product Quality 1.942 0.701 
Teams 0.870 0.337 
Autonomy  0.554 0.497 
General Firm Characteristics 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.217 0.412 
Establishment Size 294.308 857.423 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.258 0.280 
Temporary Workers 0.380 0.486 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.439 0.496 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.241 0.428 
Union Workers 0.659 0.474 
Financial Participation 0.633 0.482 
Owner Manager 0.096 0.294 
Foreign Owned 0.104 0.305 
Operation Over Five Years 0.890 0.313 
Multi-skilling 3.000 1.852 
Number of Recognized Unions 1.538 2.006 
Induction Training 0.844 0.363 
Off-site Training 3.941 2.040 
Just-in-time Production 0.296 0.457 
Information 2.729 1.086 
Incentive Alignment 2.310 0.846 
Decisions 3.742 0.980 
Work at Home 5.369 0.930 
Firm Ownership 
Private Sector Franchise 0.011 0.106 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.372 0.483 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise 0.011 0.104 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise 0.300 0.458 
Public Sector 0.309 0.462 
Industry 
Manufacturing 0.136 0.343 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.037 0.188 
Construction 0.051 0.220 
Wholesale and Retail 0.147 0.354 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.058 0.234 
Transport and Communication 0.062 0.241 
Financial Services 0.046 0.210 
Other Business Services 0.104 0.305 
Public Administration 0.084 0.277 
Education 0.111 0.315 
Health 0.114 0.317 
Other Community Services 0.051 0.219 
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Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators 0.007 0.082 
Professional Occupations 0.141 0.348 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations 0.082 0.275 
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations 0.178 0.383 
Craft and Related Occupations 0.105 0.307 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations 0.143 0.350 
Sales Occupations 0.108 0.311 
Plant and Machine Operatives 0.127 0.333 
Other Occupations 0.108 0.311 
Note:  Statistics for financial performance are computed using the subsample of 952 establishments for which financial performance is  
interpreted to mean profit or value added.  For all other variables, statistics are based on the full sample. 
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TABLE 3: 
How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Financial Performance Varies with Firm Characteristics 
 ∆Effect A3 ∆Effect A1 ∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
Basic Firm Characteristics 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.036 -0.073 0.108 
Establishment Size 0.630 -0.494 1.124 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.066 -0.126 0.192 
Temporary Workers -0.009 0.030 -0.039 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.054 -0.118 0.172 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.069 -0.149 0.217 
Union Workers 0.007 0.017 -0.010 
Financial Participation  0.053 -0.068 0.121 
Owner Manager 0.085 -0.148 0.233 
Foreign Owned 0.004 -0.061 0.065 
Operation Over Five Years -0.053 0.126 -0.179 
Multi-Skilling 0.029 -0.050 0.080 
Number of Recognized Unions -0.077 0.114 -0.191 
Induction Training 0.064 -0.127 0.191 
Off-site Training 0.014 -0.017 0.032 
Just-in-time Production 0.049 -0.105 0.154 
Information 0.029 -0.038 0.067 
Incentive Alignment -0.040 0.059 -0.098 
Decisions  0.004 -0.005 0.009 
Work at Home  -0.010 0.014 -0.024 
Firm Ownership 
Private Sector Franchise 0.136 -0.446 0.582 
Private Sector Non-franchise 0.025 0.013 0.012 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise -0.171 0.334 -0.505 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise -0.134 0.285 -0.420 
Industry 
Manufacturing 0.038 -0.054 0.091 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.128 -0.311 0.439 
Construction 0.087 -0.185 0.272 
Hotels and Restaurants -0.079 0.124 -0.203 
Transport and Communication -0.006 0.024 -0.030 
Financial Services -0.032 0.061 -0.093 
Other Business Services -0.023 0.047 -0.070 
Public Administration 0.051 -0.088 0.139 
Education 0.114 -0.126 0.240 
Health 0.028 -0.031 0.060 
Other Community Services -0.128 0.162 -0.290 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators     -0.037 0.060 -0.096 
Professional Occupations         0.086 -0.188 0.274 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations      0.069 -0.273 0.342 
Craft and Related Occupations        -0.007 0.024 -0.031 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations         -0.016 0.037 -0.052 
Sales Occupations     0.018 -0.006 0.024 
Plant and Machine Operatives        -0.058 0.102 -0.160 
Other Occupations         -0.022 0.040 -0.062 
Note:  The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are, respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, 
and clerical and secretarial.  (Effect A3)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A3)i = Prob(Yi = 3| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 3 | TEAMSi = 
0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s financial performance is a lot above industry average.  Cell 
entries under “∆Effect A3” indicate how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.  This is computed 
slightly differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy variable, one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or 
a continuous variable.  When characteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment (Effect A3 | Xi  = 1) - (Effect A3 
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| Xi  = 0) holding all of the other characteristics at their actual establishment levels.  Then we took the average of these differences across all 
establishments in the sample.  When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the computation was the same as the one 
just described, except that the other dummies in the same group were evaluated at zero rather than at their observed values for each 
establishment.  The three groups of dummies that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables.  When the X 
in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between X = 1 and X = 0 but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of 
X, again holding all the characteristics of the establishment at their individual values.  (Effect A1)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A1)i 
= Prob(Yi = 1| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s 
financial performance is average or below.  The “∆Effect A1” column was computed analogously.  The “∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1)” column is 
simply the difference between the first and second columns and is our measure of the degree to which the predicted benefit from teams to 
financial performance varies with the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.  N = 889.      
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TABLE 4: 
How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Labor Productivity Varies with Firm Characteristics 
 ∆Effect A3 ∆Effect A1 ∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
Basic Firm Characteristics 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.006 -0.013 0.019 
Establishment Size -0.346 0.808 -1.154 
Fraction of Part Time Workers 0.012 -0.025 0.037 
Temporary Workers 0.003 -0.007 0.010 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year 0.005 -0.010 0.015 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.071 -0.163 0.234 
Union Workers -0.073 0.152 -0.225 
Financial Participation  -0.039 0.089 -0.129 
Owner Manager 0.013 -0.024 0.037 
Foreign Owned -0.013 0.024 -0.037 
Operation Over Five Years -0.009 0.019 -0.028 
Multi-Skilling  -0.002 0.006 -0.008 
Number of Recognized Unions 0.020 -0.041 0.061 
Induction Training 0.027 -0.054 0.081 
Off-site Training -0.047 0.095 -0.143 
Just-in-time Production -0.006 0.011 -0.017 
Information 0.014 -0.027 0.041 
Incentive Alignment -0.012 0.025 -0.037 
Decisions  0.004 -0.008 0.011 
Work at Home  -0.004 0.008 -0.012 
Firm Ownership 
Private Sector Franchise 0.158 -0.486 0.644 
Private Sector Non-franchise -0.006 0.024 -0.030 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise -0.049 0.160 -0.209 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise      -0.078 0.163 -0.242 
Industry 
Manufacturing 0.004 -0.008 0.012 
Electricity, Gas, and Water -0.002 0.006 -0.008 
Construction -0.006 0.014 -0.020 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.005 -0.010 0.014 
Transport and Communication 0.027 -0.054 0.080 
Financial Services -0.008 0.018 -0.026 
Other Business Services -0.010 0.022 -0.033 
Public Administration -0.011 0.025 -0.036 
Education 0.009 -0.018 0.027 
Health 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
Other Community Services 0.001 -0.002 0.003 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators     0.006 -0.012 0.018 
Professional Occupations         0.019 -0.034 0.053 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations        -0.007 0.015 -0.023 
Craft and Related Occupations        0.013 -0.025 0.037 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations         -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
Sales Occupations     -0.016 0.034 -0.050 
Plant and Machine Operatives        -0.011 0.025 -0.036 
Other Occupations         -0.010 0.021 -0.031 
Note:  The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are, respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, 
and clerical and secretarial.  (Effect A3)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A3)i = Prob(Yi = 3| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 3 | TEAMSi = 
0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s labor productivity is a lot above industry average.  Cell 
entries under “∆Effect A3” indicate how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.  This is computed 
slightly differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy variable, one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or 
a continuous variable.  When characteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment (Effect A3 | Xi  = 1) - (Effect A3 
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| Xi  = 0) holding all of the other characteristics at their actual establishment levels.  Then we took the average of these differences across all 
establishments in the sample.  When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the computation was the same as the one 
just described, except that the other dummies in the same group were evaluated at zero rather than at their observed values for each 
establishment.  The three groups of dummies that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables.  When the X 
in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between X = 1 and X = 0 but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of 
X, again holding all the characteristics of the establishment at their individual values.  (Effect A1)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A1)i 
= Prob(Yi = 1| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s labor 
productivity is average or below.  The “∆Effect A1” column was computed analogously.  The “∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1)” column is simply the 
difference between the first and second columns and is our measure of the degree to which the predicted benefit from teams to labor 





How the Predicted Benefit of Teams on Product Quality Varies with Firm Characteristics 
 ∆Effect A3 ∆Effect A1 ∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1) 
Basic Firm Characteristics 
Single-Establishment Firm 0.020 -0.024 0.045 
Establishment Size -0.230 0.531 -0.761 
Fraction of Part Time Workers -0.014 0.016 -0.030 
Temporary Workers 0.048 -0.067 0.115 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year -0.059 0.075 -0.133 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year 0.036 -0.039 0.075 
Union Workers -0.051 0.068 -0.120 
Financial Participation  -0.019 0.022 -0.040 
Owner Manager 0.018 -0.005 0.023 
Foreign Owned 0.107 -0.149 0.256 
Operation Over Five Years -0.089 0.153 -0.242 
Multi-Skilling  -0.016 0.024 -0.040 
Number of Recognized Unions  0.008 -0.017 0.024 
Induction Training  -0.012 0.021 -0.033 
Off-site Training  0.022 -0.023 0.045 
Just-in-time Production -0.050 0.070 -0.120 
Information 0.025 -0.026 0.051 
Incentive Alignment -0.036 0.039 -0.074 
Decisions  0.010 -0.011 0.021 
Work at Home  -0.012 0.013 -0.025 
Firm Ownership 
Private Sector Franchise -0.164 0.207 -0.370 
Private Sector Non-franchise -0.023 0.073 -0.096 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise -0.026 0.045 -0.071 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise -0.042 0.090 -0.132 
Industry 
Manufacturing -0.001 0.019 -0.020 
Electricity, Gas, and Water -0.110 0.138 -0.248 
Construction -0.045 0.076 -0.120 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.027 -0.027 0.054 
Transport and Communication 0.081 -0.138 0.219 
Financial Services -0.081 0.117 -0.198 
Other Business Services -0.047 0.074 -0.121 
Public Administration -0.097 0.134 -0.231 
Education 0.011 0.004 0.007 
Health -0.039 0.071 -0.110 
Other Community Services 0.003 -0.006 0.009 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators     -0.022 0.019 -0.041 
Professional Occupations         0.004 0.018 -0.014 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations        -0.057 0.067 -0.124 
Craft and Related Occupations        0.072 -0.104 0.176 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations         0.025 -0.048 0.073 
Sales Occupations     -0.039 0.048 -0.087 
Plant and Machine Operatives        -0.026 0.020 -0.046 
Other Occupations         -0.029 0.031 -0.060 
Note:  The omitted categories for firm ownership, industry, and largest occupational group are, respectively, public sector, wholesale and retail, 
and clerical and secretarial.  (Effect A3)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A3)i = Prob(Yi = 3| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 3 | TEAMSi = 
0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s product quality is a lot above industry average.  Cell entries 
under “∆Effect A3” indicate how this effect varies, on average, by the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.  This is computed slightly 
differently according to whether the characteristic is a single dummy variable, one dummy variable from a group of related dummies, or a 
continuous variable.  When characteristic X is a single dummy variable, we computed for each establishment (Effect A3 | Xi  = 1) - (Effect A3 | 
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Xi  = 0) holding all of the other characteristics at their actual establishment levels.  Then we took the average of these differences across all 
establishments in the sample.  When the X in question is one dummy in a group of related dummies, the computation was the same as the one 
just described, except that the other dummies in the same group were evaluated at zero rather than at their observed values for each 
establishment.  The three groups of dummies that are considered in this way are the industry, occupation, and ownership variables.  When the X 
in question is continuous, the differences we computed were not between X = 1 and X = 0 but rather between the 0.75 and the 0.25 quantile of 
X, again holding all the characteristics of the establishment at their individual values.  (Effect A1)i for establishment i is defined as (Effect A1)i 
= Prob(Yi = 1| TEAMSi = 1) – Prob(Yi = 1 | TEAMSi = 0), which is the effect of team production on the probability that establishment i’s 
product quality is average or below.  The “∆Effect A1” column was computed analogously.  The “∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1)” column is simply 
the difference between the first and second columns and is our measure of the degree to which the predicted benefit from teams to product 
quality varies with the firm characteristic indicated by the row title.  N = 1839.      
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TABLE 6: 









Basic Firm Characteristics 
Single-Establishment Firm + + + 
Establishment Size + - - 
Fraction of Part Time Workers + + - 
Temporary Workers - + + 
Fixed Term Workers Under One Year + + - 
Fixed Term Workers Over One Year + + + 
Union Workers - - - 
Financial Participation + - - 
Owner Manager + + + 
Foreign Owned + - + 
Operation Over Five Years - - - 
Multi-Skilling + - - 
Number of Recognized Unions - + + 
Induction Training + + - 
Off-site Training + - + 
Just-in-time Production + - - 
Information + + + 
Incentive Alignment - - - 
Decisions + + + 
Work at Home - - - 
Firm Ownership 
Private Sector Franchise + + - 
Private Sector Non-franchise + - - 
Alternative Private Sector Franchise - - - 
Alternative Private Sector Non-franchise - - - 
Industry 
Manufacturing + + - 
Electricity, Gas, and Water + - - 
Construction + - - 
Hotels and Restaurants - + + 
Transport and Communication - + + 
Financial Services - - - 
Other Business Services - - - 
Public Administration + - - 
Education + + + 
Health + - - 
Other Community Services - + + 
Largest Occupational Group at Workplace 
Managers and Administrators - + - 
Professional Occupations + + - 
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations + - - 
Craft and Related Occupations - + + 
Personal and Protective Service Occupations - - + 
Sales Occupations + - - 
Plant and Machine Operatives - - - 
Other Occupations - - - 
Note:  +/- represents the signs from Tables 3, 4, and 5 of ∆(Effect A3 – Effect A1), which is a measure of the degree to which the predicted benefit, in 
terms of financial performance, labor productivity or product quality, from teams varies with firm characteristics.  
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 FIGURE 1:  (Effect A3 – Effect A1) for Financial Performance Model 
   
Note: (Effect A3 – Effect A1) is a measure of the degree to which a firm benefits in terms of its financial  
performance from team production.  Effect A3 is the effect of team production on the probability that a  
firm’s financial performance is a lot above industry average, and Effect A1 is the effect of team production 
on the probability that a firm’s financial performance is average or below.  The bandwidth of 0.083 was 




FIGURE 2:  (Effect A3 – Effect A1) for Labor Productivity Model 
 
Note: (Effect A3 – Effect A1) is a measure of the degree to which a firm benefits in terms of its labor productivity 
from team production.  Effect A3 is the effect of team production on the probability that a firm’s labor productivity 
is a lot above industry average, and Effect A1 is the effect of team production on the probability that a firm’s labor 
productivity is average or below.  The bandwidth of 0.043 was chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared  
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FIGURE 3:  (Effect A3 – Effect A1) for the Product Quality Model 
 
Note: (Effect A3 – Effect A1) is a measure of the degree to which a firm benefits in terms of its product 
quality from team production.  Effect A3 is the effect of team production on the probability that a firm’s  
product quality is a lot above industry average, and Effect A1 is the effect of team production on the  
probability that a firm’s product quality is average or below.  The bandwidth of 0.042 was chosen to 
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